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2017 TAX CUTS AND CORPORATE INVESTMENT AND
FINANCING DECISIONS: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
ABSTRACT
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 1917 (TCJA) amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
and significantly lowered the corporate tax rate, in addition to providing other tax incentives to
spur corporate investments. The TCJA has the potential to impact corporate cash flows and
corporate investment and financing decisions. In response to the TCJA, firms could enhance
their capital expenditure budgets, return excess capital to shareholders, and/or hold excess capital
for better opportunities in the future. Using S&P 500 firms as a sample, this study finds no
statistical difference in the actual corporate taxes paid in the post-and pre-TCJA periods, which
may be due to many factors, including earnings management and a new tax on multinationals’
foreign income. Regardless, U.S. corporations significantly increased their capital expenditures
following the tax cuts. Although this finding is consistent with the Act’s intent, higher capital
expenditures coincided with higher borrowing and higher dividend payments and share
repurchases, implying that both investments and repurchases were primarily debt financed.
Overall, the study finds significant changes in corporate investment and financing behavior after
the TCJA of 2017.
INTRODUCTION
Public Law No. 115-97 (initially introduced in the House of Representatives as the Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act or TCJA) passed by Congress in 2017 has significantly revised the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986. In particular, the corporate tax rate has been reduced from 35% to 21%,
providing significant tax savings for corporations. In addition, the Act allows for most tangible
property purchased after September 27, 2017 and before January 1, 2023 to be fully expensed
during the first tax year of use. Tangible property acquired during tax years beginning in 2023
will be 80% deductible in that tax year, scaling down 20% each year, with no special expensing
provided for 2027 and later years (TCJA, 2017).
The act is intended to make U.S. firms globally more competitive, by leaving more cash
flows in the hands of corporations to invest for greater economic growth and employment.
Although the annual benefit from the tax cuts may be significant, it is not clear how firms will us
this tax windfall. Firms, in general, have three options: 1) Invest in those marginal projects that
were earlier rejected but have since become value enhancing due to the lower tax rate. 2) Reduce
the size of the balance sheet by reducing total debt and/or shareholders’ equity. 3) Hold cash, in
the absence of any positive net present value (NPV) projects, and wait for better opportunities.
The above options are not mutually exclusive: A firm, for example, could use some of the funds
to expand its budget for capital expenditures and for reductions in loans and shareholders’
equity, while keeping the remainder for future use. Media coverage of the TCJA indicates that
the tax cuts have not resulted in increased capital expenditures (Forbes, 2018). Thus, the impact
of the TCJA on corporate investment and financing decisions is an empirical question.
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Each of the three options previously described can potentially create or destroy value,
depending on the characteristics of the firms involved. For example, many studies have reported
a positive stock price reaction to capital expenditure increases (McConnell and Muscarella,
1985; Vafeas and Shenoy, 2005; Chung, Wright, and Charoenwang, 1998). However, capital
expenditures motivated by agency reasons can destroy value (Titman, Wei, and Xie, 2004).
Likewise, debt reduction and share repurchase announcements are generally viewed positively
by investors (Cai and Zhang, 2009, Vermaelen, 1981, Comment and Jarrell, 1991, Peyer and
Vermaelen, (2009). Debt reductions may provide more financial flexibility to the firms in future
time periods and share repurchases, by returning excess capital to shareholders, provide
assurance that managers are not wasting excess capital in value-reducing activities. However,
firms can also create value by borrowing more to reach their target leverage or to take on
positive NPV projects (Hull, 1999; Denis and McKeon, 2012). Finally, firms can create longterm value by holding cash and waiting for better future opportunities (Mikhail Simutin, 2010).
However, corporate cash hoardings have also been reported as wealth destroying (Lee and
Powell, 2011),
This study focuses on corporate decision-making in the wake of the tax cuts and the
study’s findings should be of interest to both policy makers and investors. The study attempts to
determine the impact of the TCJA on corporate taxes. More importantly, the study attempts to
answer the questions of whether the tax cuts were associated with higher capital expenditures in
the 2018-2019 period, as intended by the lawmakers, or whether firms found alternative uses for
the excess cash flows, such as dividend payments and share repurchases.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The marginal tax rate on corporate income in the U.S. was as low as 1% during 19091915 and as high as 53% during 1946-1949 (Tax Foundation, 2020), yet it appears that there is
no consensus on the precise impact of corporate tax rates on investments, productivity, and
economic growth For example, while the Council of Economic Advisors (2017), citing many
studies, argued in favor of the tax cuts to promote higher capital investments and wages, Bivens
and Blair (2018), using data from multiple countries with different corporate tax rates, showed a
positive relationship between tax rates and capital employed per unit of labor. At the micro
level, a lower corporate tax rate, by lowering the firm’s cost of capital, should result in enhanced
capital expenditures; however, the tax rate is just one of many factors impacting the firm’s
investment decisions, and other factors such as economic uncertainty also play an important role,
at least in the short run.
Capital Expenditures and Firm Value
Finance literature is rich in research on how firms may deploy cash flows for shareholder
wealth maximization or managerial entrenchment. Firms are expected to use some optimal debtequity mix and invest the funds in value-enhancing projects. Early research attempted to
determine market’s response to information on capital expenditures. McConnell and Muscarella
(1985) investigated whether announced changes in capital expenditures from the previous year
were viewed positively or negatively by investors. The authors found that the market reaction
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was positive when the change in capital expenditures was positive. The authors conjectured that
the market response was caused by the enhanced or diminished future investment opportunities.
McConnell and Muscarella did not use information on specific projects but focused on the level
of capital expenditures relative to the previous year. Later research on capital expenditures dove
into specific types of capital expenditures and firm characteristics to better understand and
separate wealth enhancing capital expenditures from wealth destroying capital expenditures.
Chan, Martin, and Kensinger (1990) found that increased R&D expenditures were associated
with higher announcement period abnormal returns; however, increased R&D expenditures by
low-tech firms were associated with significantly negative returns. In a similar vein, Titman
Wei, and Xie (2004) reported that firms with greater investment discretion (high free cash flows
and low debt ratios) made wealth reducing investments in years when takeovers were less
prevalent. Similarly, Vafeas and Shenoy (2005) found that not all increased capital expenditure
announcements were wealth enhancing. In particular, the authors found that increased capital
expenditures by high free cash flow firms with limited investment opportunities elicited a
negative response from the market. Lastly, Kumar and Li (2016) found that firms that invested
in enhanced innovative capacity generated higher subsequent cumulative stock returns with a
lag.
Capital Structure Changes and Firm Value
In a perfect market, a firm’s choice of capital structure is irrelevant (Modigliani and
Miller, 1958). In the Modigliani and Miller world, debt/equity issuances (repurchases) have no
meaning. A firm’s choice of capital structure in the real world, however, is material and impacts
the firm’s cost of capital in the presence of taxes, financial distress costs, agency costs, and
asymmetric information costs. The trade-off theory of capital structure predicts an optimal
capital structure that minimizes a firm’s cost of capital, a point where the benefit of financial
leverage (tax-deductibility of interest expense) and the cost of financial leverage (financial
distress) are in perfect balance. Hull (1999) found that the market reaction to capital structure
changes were significantly more negative when announced changes moved the firms away from
the industry debt-equity averages than when the changes moved the firms closer to the industry
norms, thus providing support for the trade-off theory.
According to the asymmetric information theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984), the fact that
investors are less informed about the firm’s investment opportunities will lead to a negative stock
price reaction when managers raise additional financing. This is rational behavior on the part of
investors as they try to hedge against the probability that the new issuances are over-valued. This
theory predicts that managers will first use retained earnings, then debt, and lastly new equity to
finance projects to minimize the costs of asymmetric information. Like Modigliani and Miller,
Myers and Majluf predict no single optimal structure – firms will borrow to accept positive NPV
projects and repay loans when there are no value enhancing projects. Denis and McKeon (2012)
found support for this theory in their study of firms that proactively raised debt levels to meet
financial shortfalls even though it meant deviating from their estimated target debt ratios for
years.
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Dividend payments and share repurchases not only change a firm’s capital structure, but
they also prevent wasteful investments by removing excess capital from the firm (Jensen, 1986).
Early studies on dividend changes reported a positive relation between dividend changes and
future profitability (Nissim and Ziv, 2001). Early studies on share repurchases focused on the
effect of the changes in financial leverage on equity values and reported a positive relation
between the two. For example, Masulis (1980) found a positive impact of debt for equity
exchanges on the equity values of these firms. Both Dann (1981) and Vermaelen (1981)
reported positive announcement period stock price gains for firms announcing share repurchases.
As with capital expenditures, research on financial leverage and share buybacks also became
more nuanced as researchers analyzed share buyback announcements by the announcing firms’
characteristics
Managers may be motivated by selfish reasons to repurchase company stock as
repurchases increase earnings per share (EPS), which may lead to higher rewards for managers.
Almeida, Fos, and Kronlund (2016) found that firms were more likely to use repurchases when
they were going to miss the EPS forecast. These repurchases were found to result in lower
investments and employment in subsequent periods. On the other hand, repurchases can prevent
managers from destroying value by removing free cash flows from managers’ control (Jensen,
1986). Steven and Weisbach (1998) reported that repurchases were positively related to the level
of free cash flows with the repurchasing firms. Grullon and Michaely (2004) reported that
repurchases were more wealth enhancing for firms that were more likely to overinvest.
Furthermore, repurchases may be signals from managers that the firm is undervalued (e.g.,
Vermaelen, 1981, 1984; Miller and Rock, 1985; Ofer and Thakor, 1987; Constantinides and
Grundy, 1989). Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and D’Mello and Shroff (2000) reported
evidence confirming the undervaluation hypothesis. Baker and Wurgler (2002), in their market
timing theory, also use the equity undervaluation argument that motivates managers to
repurchase their stock.
Cash Hoarding and Firm Value
Firms hold cash for a variety of reasons including making timely payments, having
backup liquidity, and planning/waiting for investment opportunities. Firms approaching the
mature stage of business are expected to initiate dividend payments as well as share repurchase
programs to distribute excess capital to their owners. Mikhail Simutin (2010) found that excess
cash holding was a proxy for risky opportunities: Cash rich firms, while earning a lower rate in
the present, invested more in future time periods and earned a higher future return. Lee and
Powell (2011) divided their sample of Australian firms into transient excess cash firms and
persistent excess cash firms and found that the former earned consistently higher risk-adjusted
returns than the latter.
STUDY QUESTIONS AND DESIGN
This study attempts to understand U.S. corporations’ investment and financing decisions
in the wake of the corporate tax cuts of 2017. The study examines corporate capital expenditures,

Published by Digital Commons @ Southern University and A&M College, 2022

5

Southern University College of Business E-Journal, Vol. 15 [2022], Iss. 3, Art. 4

total debt levels, net share repurchases, and cash holdings in the pre- and post-TCJA periods to
understand corporate decision-making in response to the tax cuts.
For the sample, the study uses S&P 500 firms as these are the largest firms representing
eleven different industries. Three industries, namely, utilities, financials, and real estate
investment trusts, were excluded as these industries lack operating and financial flexibility
enjoyed by unregulated businesses. Financial data were gathered from Bloomberg. In particular,
information was gathered on cash taxes paid (CF_CASH_PAID_FOR_TAX), corporate
investments (annual change in GROSS_FIXED_ASSETS), share repurchases
(NET_REPURCHASES), dividend payments (CF_DVD_PAID), current assets
(BS_CURRENT_ASSET), cash and short-term investments (CASH_&_ST_INVESTMENTS),
and total debt (SHORT_AND_LONG_TERM_DEBT) for the 2015-2019 period. The average
value for each variable for each firm for 2015-2016 (pre-TCJA period) was computed and
subtracted from the average value for 2018-2019 (post-TCJA period). The change in each
variable’s value was averaged across the sample firms and a t-statistic was calculated by dividing
the mean value by the standard error of the mean value (standard deviation of the mean value/√n,
where n varied from 334 to 370, depending on data availability).
FINDINGS
First, this study estimated the dollar amount of tax benefit due to the lower corporate tax
rate. Since the main provisions of the TCJA became effective on January 1, 2018, information
on corporate taxes is available for only one year (i.e. 2018). Table 1 provides information on the
mean change in the actual taxes paid (taxes paid for 2018 less the average taxes for 2015-2016)
by S&P 500 firms. For the entire sample, the average tax paid in 2018 was higher by about $14
million than the pre-TCJA period but this change is statistically insignificant. The consumer
discretionary industry paid significantly more taxes (about $259 million) and the energy industry
paid significantly less taxes (about -$1.7 billion) in the post-TCJA period. The changes for all
other industries are insignificant at the conventional confidence levels. There could be many
reasons why the 2018 data do not show a significant tax reduction for the average firm. First,
there is evidence that firms shift their earnings to reduce taxes. For example, Guenther (1994)
found that firms, in response to the 1986 Tax Reform Act, significantly reduced their current
accruals (accounts receivable and accrued payables) in the year prior to the tax rate reduction to
move their incomes to the following year to lower their taxes. Klassen, Lang, and Wolfson
(1993) found evidence on how multinationals moved their incomes to the U.S. in 1986-87 as a
result of the lowering of the U.S. tax rates in 1986. Second, a tax law change affecting
multinationals may be partly responsible for the increase in the 2018 corporate taxes. Before the
TCJA, global earnings of U.S.-based companies were taxed but taxes were deferred until the
earnings were repatriated. Under the TCJA, a U. S. parent firm generally must pay an immediate
U. S. income tax at a 10.5% rate (the rate will increase to 13.1% after 2025) on profits of its
foreign subsidiaries related to intangible assets. For profits on tangible depreciable assets, the
tax bill allows firms to have tax-free treatment for a portion of their foreign income up to a
reasonable amount of return. Half of the remainder is taxed at the parent's rate. Finally, the
continuing economic expansion may also explain higher tax collections on higher corporate
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income. The impact of the TCJA on corporate taxes will become clearer as more data become
available.
Table 1
Mean Changes in Corporate Taxes in the Post-TCJA Period for S&P 500 Industries
(In Millions of Dollars)

S&P 500 Industry

Mean Change in Taxes Paid
(t-value)
$14.06
(0.14)
$412.14
(0.58)
$259.04
(2.53**)
-$90.91
(-0.22)
-$1,666.22
(-3.15**)
$186.39
(1.10)
$233.02
(0.92)
$29.06
(0.23)
-$85.78
(-0.49)

All S&P 500 Industries1
Communications
Discretionary
Staples
Energy
Healthcare
Industrial
Information Tech.
Materials
1Excluding

three industries, financials, REITs, and utilities.

**Significant at the 1% confidence level.

The lower corporate tax rate coupled with the ability to immediately expense an
investment in tangible property should enhance the present value of the after-tax project cash
flows, thus converting at least some previously negative NPV projects into positive NPV
projects. However, corporate managers may be reluctant to make large capital investments if
they perceive an uncertain economic future, thus leading to insignificant changes in investments.
Table 2 displays information on mean changes in gross fixed assets, current assets, and cash and
short-term investments between the pre- and post-TCJA periods.
Table 2
Mean Changes in Asset Values in the Post-TCJA Period for S&P 500 Industries
(In Millions of Dollars)
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S&P 500
Industry

Mean Change in Gross
Fixed Assets
(t-value)
(I)

All S&P 500
Industries1
Communications

Mean Change in
Current Assets
(t-value)
(II)

$1,073.84
$1,465.89
(5.46**)
(3.82**)
$3,872.05
$7,677.80
(2.42*)
(2.93**)
Discretionary
$1,368.31
$1,642.90
(2.64**)
(2.20*)
Staples
$691.93
-$483.16
(2.73**)
(-0.83)
Energy
$3,299.63
$1,057.23
(1.97*)
(1.29)
Healthcare
$606.63
$1,664.03
(2.90**)
(2.22*)
Industrial
$284.69
$602.08
(1.74)
(0.71)
Information
$351.60
$616.94
Tech.
(1.55)
(0.59)
Materials
$1,329.15
$1,858.38
(2.01*)
(1.37)
1Excluding three industries, financials, REITs, and utilities.

Mean Change in
Cash and Short-Term
Investments
(t-value)
(III)
$82.59
(0.31)
-$1,180.5
(-0.55)
$443.27
(1.04)
-$775.48
(-1.66)
-$438.95
(-0.96)
$47.08
(0.07)
-$347.38
(-1.02)
-$571.50
(-0.69)
-$256.54
(-1.27)

*Significant at the 5% confidence level.
**Significant at the 1% confidence level.
As compared to the 2015-2016 period, S&P 500 firms significantly increased their capital
expenditures in 2018-2019 (Column I). The mean change is about $1 billion, which is
statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. Furthermore, it does not appear that the
above result was driven by one or two industries. Capital expenditures increased in all eight
industries. The increase is highly significant for six of the eight industries. For the industrials
and information technology firms, the change is marginally significant at the 10% level in a onetail test. Barring the possibility that these capital expenditure increases were planned before the
TCJA, the tax cuts appear to be associated with significant capital expenditure increases across
all industries.
Increases in long-term investments also require greater investments in working capital
accounts, such as inventories and accounts receivable, to support higher anticipated sales.
Column (II) of Table 2 shows that the average value of current assets increased by approximately
$1.5 billion, a significant change at the 1% confidence level. All industries except consumer
staples saw increases in current assets. However, this increase was statistically significant for
only three industries, communications, consumer discretionary, and healthcare. Since cash and
short-term investments are part of current assets, it is possible that the increases in current assets
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were caused by increases in cash and short-term investments, implying that firms were hoarding
at least some cash, perhaps waiting for a more opportune time to invest. Column (III), however,
shows this not to be the case. Firms on average held about $83 million more in cash and shortterm investments in the post-TCJA period but this change is statistically insignificant. It is
important to note that all industries except consumer discretionary and healthcare saw declines in
cash and short-term investments, although none of the changes are significant, so it appears that
tax cuts were not associated with higher corporate cash balances in the post-TCJA period. This
finding is consistent with the view that hoarding cash, especially by large firms, may be difficult
as these firms face scrutiny from shareholder activists, who, fearing wasteful investments by
managers, demand all excess capital to be distributed via dividends/share buybacks. Such firms
also face criticism from governments and may also become takeover targets for their cash
stockpiles.
Next, this study addresses the question of whether the tax cuts were also associated with
changes on the financing side of the balance sheet. More specifically, firms could use the excess
funds to pay off some loans or to increase dividends/share repurchases. Table 3 contains postTCJA changes for three variables, total debt, dividend payments, and share repurchases for S&P
500 firms.
Table 3
Mean Changes in Financing Accounts in the Post-TCJA Period for S&P 500 Industries
(In Millions of Dollars)
S&P 500
Industry

Mean Change in
Total Debt
(t-value)
(I)
All S&P 500
$2,642.43
Industries1
(6.11**)
Communications $11,012.54
(3.39**)
Discretionary
$3,379.44
(3.54**)
Staples
$2,481.23
(3.45**)
Energy
$689.50
(0.56)
Healthcare
$3,467.60
(2.96**)
Industrial
$1,170,44
(1.05)
Information
$1,503.74
Tech.
(2.90**)
Materials
$340.19
(0.53)

Mean Change in
Dividend Payments
(t-value)
(II)
$194.94
(4.66**)
$871.92
(2.04*)
$86.10
(2.14*)
$124.12
(1.52)
$143.21
(1.35)
$210.34
(3.49**)
$44.76
(0.45)
$272.40
(5.31**)
$73.53
(2.53**)
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Mean Change in Share
Repurchases
(t-value)
(III)
$471.31
(2.16*)
$1,159.61
(1.06)
$89.19
(0.44)
-$316.53
(-1.78)
$647.19
(1.48)
$507.89
(1.54)
-$265.87
(-0.69)
$1,877.44
(2.01*)
$15.42
(0.16)
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1Excluding

three industries, financial, REITs, and utilities.

*Significant at the 5% confidence level.
**Significant at the 1% confidence level.
Column (1) shows that S&P 500 firms on average increased their total debt (the sum of
short-term and long-term debt) by about $2.6 billion in the post-TCJA period. This increase is
statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. Five of the eight industries show significant
increases in total debt. Three industries, energy, industrials, and materials show debt increases
that are statistically insignificant. Firms increased dividend payments by an average of about
$195 million (column (II)) and share repurchases by an average of about $471 million (column
III), both these changes being statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. It should be
noted that while all industries saw dividend increases, the increases are significant for only five
of the eight industries. As far as share repurchases, two industries, consumer staples and
industrials saw insignificant reductions in the post-TCJA period, while the information
technology industry was the only industry that significantly increased share repurchases.
In conclusion, it appears that the tax cuts announced during an on-going multiyear
economic expansion created more investment opportunities for businesses, who decided to
finance these investments mainly with borrowed funds, while reducing shareholders’ equity
through increased dividends and share repurchases.
Figure 1 displays the post-TCJA changes in corporate investments and financing
decisions.

FIGURE 1
Mean Investment and Financing Values Before and After
TCJA
(In Millions of Dollars)
$14,000.00
$12,000.00
$10,000.00
$8,000.00
$6,000.00
$4,000.00
$2,000.00

$0.00
Current assets

Fixed Assets
Pre-TCJA

Total Debt

Dividends

Repurchases

Post-TCJA

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
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Using S&P 500 firms as a sample, this study examines the corporate investment and
financing decisions in the wake of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. The study finds that
corporate capital expenditures increased significantly in 2018-2019. However, corporations also
took on significantly more debt, while simultaneously increasing dividends and share
repurchases. There is no evidence that firms were hoarding cash.
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